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ASSESSING ENGLISH HOSPITALS: CONTRADICTION AND CONFLICT  
 
ABSTRACT 
Purpose – This paper aims to examine the micro effects of performance measures 
introduced in England to control hospitals, following the changing context in the policy 
directing  the  delivery  of  healthcare  introduced  by  the  Labour  Government.  The 
legislative  framework  established  in  1999  reflected  a  discontinuity  in  the  way  that 
hospitals are controlled in this country.  
Design/methodology/approach – This exploratory case study is a result of a deep 
empirical investigation. It draws on some aspects of Laughlin’s (1991) and Broadbent 
and Laughlin’s (2005) analysis of organisational change.  
Findings - This study indicates that, in seeking to change to meet the demands of a 
particular  control  device,  this  organisation  pursued  both  proactive  and  reactive 
strategies. However, it was deflected from its intended pathway of change and, as a 
result;  it  failed  to  meet  the  intended  outcomes.  The  pressure  exerted  by  such  a 
demand impacted on the hospital’s activities in a conflicting way. 
Originality/value  –  There  is  insufficient  understanding  of  how  the  government’s 
policies  to  control  have  affected  hospitals’  daily  activities.  Equally,  there  is  scarce 
understanding  of  how  managers  and  medical  personnel  deal  with  the  pressure  to 
change to meet government’s expectation. This paper demonstrates empirically the 
complexities involved in using key targets to control hospitals activities. It contributes 
to the wide literature in performance management and organisational change.  
Research  limitations/implications  –  The  paper  examines  the  issues  from  the 
organisational  members’  perspective,  and,  therefore,  from  the  perception  of  those 
affected by control devices introduced by the Government.   
Key words: performance measurement in healthcare; organisational change; public 
sector reforms.  
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INTRODUCTION 
An increasing concern with organisational performance measurement is reflected in 
public sector reforms around the world in the last three decades (e.g. Cavaluzzo and 
Ittner, 2004; Johnson and Kaplan, 1987; Pollitt, 1986). The literature has indicated that 
the  reliance  on  the  use  of  performance  measurements  to  measure  efficiency  and 
effectiveness has become more visibly embedded in the strategies adopted by the 
Government to improve public services (Modell, 2001; Kaplan, 2001; Hood 1995).  In 
the healthcare sector, critics of reforms argue that large increases in funding have not 
delivered a comparable increase in performance (Model, 2004; Mayle et al., 2002) and 
that the government’s response to this criticism has overemphasised the adoption of 
crude throughput measures (Jones, 2002; Eddy, 1998). In the case of the English 
National Health Service (NHS), the main changes introduced since 1999 reinforced 
policies concerned with the overall ethos and alteration in structures (1999 Health Act). 
The legislation and policies directing the delivery of healthcare services introduced in 
England in 1999 gave greater significance to the use of performance indicators as 
control  device  than  preceding  Governments.  For  instance,  for  the  first  time  in  this 
country,  under-performing  hospitals  lost  their  autonomy,  because  they  did  not  fully 
meet  the  expectations  of  the  Government  (The  NHS  Performance  Ratings-Acute 
Trusts 2001). 
 
The  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  build  an  understanding  of  how  steering  processes 
introduced by the UK Government have been redefined in healthcare systems. The 
implications of the operationalisation of such policies are very broad.   There have 
been recent empirical studies examining the functioning of performance assessment 
framework  (PAF)  introduced  in  UK  NHS.  For  instance,  Chang  (2007)  explores  the 
limitations  and  implications  of  it  within  local  health  authorities.  Given  (2005)  
5 
investigates  the  HR  managers’  response  to  the  implementation  of  performance 
ratings.  However,  there  is  insufficient  understanding  of  how  approaches  to  control 
introduced  by  the  Labour  Government  have  affected  the  daily  activity  of  general 
hospitals in England. The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap. It is pertinent to 
pursue additional understanding of the development of control processes in healthcare 
in  order to build  some  understanding of  the future  role  that  they  expect  to  play  in 
society.  
 
This  case  study  draws  on  Laughlin’s  (1991)  and  Broadbent  and  Laughlin’s  (2005) 
analysis  of  organisational  change.  This  approach  provides  the  opportunity  of 
examining how organisations attempt to adjust to meet the demands inherent in the 
multifaceted  nature  of  organisational  change.  The  paper  presents  the  issues  that 
emerged during the organisation’s attempts to meet the demands of a particular set of 
key targets.  It instigates further reflection and insights on how hospitals respond to the 
pressure to meet the demands of standards established by Governments. It addresses 
the issues from the viewpoint of the organisational members’ perspective. Therefore, 
the paper adds to the wide literature on performance measurement and organisational 
change.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organised in five main sections. The following section 
introduces the research approach. Section three provides a broad overview of how 
control has been established in England since 1997 (a macro perspective). Section 
four  portrays  the  micro  effects.  Section  five  reflects  on  the  findings  and  the  final 
section concludes the paper with some insights for further research. 
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RESEARCH APPROACH  
Broadbent and Laughlin (2005) and Laughlin (1991) use the concept of steering from 
Habermas’  (1987)  critical  theory  to  provide  a  language  to  allow  discussion  of  the 
dynamics  of  the  relationship  between  the  macro  and  the  micro  levels.  The 
performance ratings system introduced to control hospitals in England in the period 
between  1999  and  2004  represented  an  important  element  of  macro  steering 
(Habermas, 1987), because it reflected the government’s intention to tackle variable 
standards of service at the micro level, in an attempt to achieve equity. The notion of 
equity introduced by the Department of Health (DoH) in 1999 was operationalised at 
the  organisational  level  through  the  monitoring  of  a  particular  set  of  key  targets 
introduced to lead to intra-organisational comparison (1999 Health Act). This study 
investigates the impact of such a policy on a particular English general acute hospital 
by adopting a broad approach that allows the recognition of the importance of the 
environment and the context within which this organisation operates. It adds to the 
wide literature on performance management and accounting change in organizations 
(Burns and Scapens, 2000; Morgan & Sturdy, 2000; Pettigrew, 1990; 1995). 
 
The theoretical model 
The analysis of the empirical data in this paper is examined in the light of the notion of 
‘disturbance’ (Laughlin, 1991, p.209). This term is adopted by Laughlin to express the 
effects that surface during organizations’ attempts to change to meet the demands of a 
control device externally imposed (see also Morgan, 1986, p.249 and Bartunek, 1984, 
p.356). As explicated by Laughlin, the analysis supported by this notion permits the 
identification  of  possible  ‘pathways’(1991:210),  which  are  routes  built  along  the 
changing process and through which organisational disturbances travel, resulting in 
different levels of organisational change. These levels of change can be classified as  
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‘first’  or  ‘second-order’  (Laughlin,  1991:214;  Broadbent  and  Laughlin,  2005:16), 
depending on the degree of intensity with which the demands of the macro steering 
affect  the  organisational  (micro)  context.  As  elucidated  by  Laughlin  (1991),  these 
levels of change can be expressed in a tangible mode by changes that occur in the 
organisational design archetypes and in a less tangible manner by the changes in the 
interpretative schemes and subsystems. Laughlin’s interpretation provides a language, 
which allows a more practical link between theory and practice.  
 
 
Design archetypes are management processes built within organizations and they are 
informed by organisational values and beliefs (Greenwood and Hinings, 1988). In this 
case, design archetypes are the formal control processes developed by the hospital’s 
attempts to change to meet the demands of a particular set of key targets introduced 
in  1999  by  the  Labour  Government  to  assess  general  hospitals  in  England. 
Interpretative schemes correspond to the set of values of the organisational members 
and  they  are  reflected  in  the  design  archetypes  and  subsystems  (Giddens,  1979; 
Bartunek,  1984).  Subsystems  are  tangible  ways  and  resources  adopted  by 
organisations in trying to accomplish the design archetypes’ demands. Subsystems 
are represented here by the informal ways and resources adopted by the Hospital in 
its daily activities to organize itself with the intention of accomplishing the demands of 
the formal processes developed to achieve the key targets. The assumption is that an 
organisation  can  contain  and  be  represented  by  its  interpretative  schemes,  design 
archetypes  and  sub-systems,  and  organisational  change  can  be  understood  by 
examining these (Laughlin, 1991, p.211). 
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This  study  investigates  organisational  and  accounting  change  by  examining  the 
organisation’s  interpretative  schemes,  design  archetypes  and  sub-systems  and  the 
way that they interact with each other. It aims to examine whether pathways of change 
assume the state of ‘colonization’ (deep change) or ‘reorientation’ (superficial change), 
which make it possible to identify cases of first or second-order change, respectively 
(Laughlin,  1991:215).  This  approach  provides  a  language  to  explore  the  individual 
interpretations  and  responses  of  institutions  in  a  way  that  it  develops  a  structural 
linkage between these aspects and the organisational system. This paper provides 
insights on how the organisational actors deal with such functions. 
 
Data collection 
This  empirical  investigation  took  place  during  twenty-one  months  period[
1];  several 
methods were employed in the data collection process. Formal and informal interviews 
were  conducted  to  provide  relevant  information  that  was  not  available  from  other 
sources, such as documentation and meetings. Formal interviews lasted 60 minutes 
on average and they were taped-recorded, with the consent of the interviewees. A 
sample  of  respondents  was  initially  selected  based  on  their  position  in  the 
organisation.  The  Chief  Executive  formalised  the  access  to  the  research  site  and 
arranged further contacts within the organisation. The interviewees were chosen in 
such a manner that allowed the researcher’s interaction with different organisational 
members at different levels and positions. The aim was not to ensure an exhaustive 
sample of all levels of types of staff, but to provide a diversity of opinions. 36 (thirty-six) 
people were formally interviewed (table I).  
 
[table I here]  
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Open-ended questions were adopted in the formal interviews, in order to allow more 
freedom  to  respondents  in  answering  the  questions,  which  evolved  around  their 
perception of the consequences of the introduction of national standards to control 
hospitals. The schedule of interviews was extended to follow up suggestions that other 
interviewees were relevant to the case. The objective was to seek information about 
the intangible elements, such as the organisation’s interpretative schemes, as well as 
the more tangible elements, such as the design archetypes and the sub-systems set 
up to monitor and collect accounting information for control. 
 
The researcher attended all the hospital’s public board meetings
2 run during the period 
of empirical investigation and this allowed the evaluation of the debates about how the 
issues were portrayed by the organisational actors. Notes were also taken, as a result 
of informal conversations that took place shortly before the board meetings. These 
notes clarified some information gathered from the board meetings’ reports that were 
provided to the researcher prior to each board meeting.   
 
A  large  number  of  documents  were  collected  and  analyzed.  These  included 
documentation  of  the  DoH,  in  particular  the  inspection  of  the  legislative  records 
regarding the legislation and policy directing the delivery of healthcare in England. This 
analysis  set  the  context  for  understanding  the  organisational  perspective. 
Documentation  regarding  this  particular  hospital  were  also  analyzed  (e.g.  Financial 
and  Activity  Reports,  Quality  Reports,  Board  Meeting  Reports).  The  organization’s 
setting  allowed  an  understanding  of  the  organization’s  profile  and  the  actual  value 
given to documents that presented the hospital.  
 
Data analysis  
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The data were analysed in the light of Laughlin’s (1987) discursive process, which is 
developed  from  Habermas’  (1987)  methodological  approach  for  understanding 
accounting change in organizations. This approach consists of 3 (three) different and 
consecutive stages that require the researcher’s involvement, albeit in different ways. 
Stage  1  encompassed  the  formulation  of  critical  theorems  that  Laughlin  refers  to 
(1987:628).  At  this  phase,  a  network  of  issues  was  developed  and  the  common 
themes were selected from the transcription of the interviews. The purpose was to 
search for understanding of the impact of the macro steering (set of key targets) upon 
the organisation. Stage 1 included the inspection of the legislative documentation in 
order to identify the themes that were represented in them; this was followed by the 
analysis of the organization’s documentation that was publicly available. The details 
that  surfaced  from  the  analysis  of  the  preliminary  data  collection  allowed  some 
understanding of the organization’s overall profile (e.g. its location, financial situation, 
staff  and  ethos  of  the  management),  and  this  allowed  some  understanding  of  the 
management’s main concerns.  
 
At stage 2, the researcher searched for a deeper interaction with the organisational 
actors, in order to confirm the critical theorems; this took place mainly during formal 
and informal interviews. The objective was to seek for details to enrich and extend the 
theorems,  to facilitate  further  reflection  on them.  At  the final  stage  of  this  analysis 
process, the researcher returned to the organisation to ensure that the understanding 
of the theorems that surfaced during stage 1 was in line with the interpretation of the 
organisational  actors.  With  the  purpose  of  ensuring  that  this  was  the  case,  the 
researcher formally re-interviewed 5 (five) people, who held key positions within this 
organisation (i.e. Chief Executive, Finance Director, two Consultant Directors and a 
Finance Manager). These interviewees assisted the researcher in the interpretation or  
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development  of  particular  situations  or  events.  The  aim  was  to  corroborate  and/or 
clarify insights that surfaced during the hospital’s internal and board meetings and as a 
result of the inspection of the organization’s documentation.  
 
The analysis of the empirical investigation is a result of the triangulation of all data 
collected  (Yin,  1999,  2003;  Ryan  et  al.,  2002).  Views  about  the  nature  of  the 
organisational  interpretative  schemes  emerged  from  the  analysis  of  the  design 
archetypes  and  from  the  values  claimed  by  organisational  members  (Morgan  and 
Sturdy, 2000; Bartunek, 1984). The theoretical approach adopted permitted both to 
discuss  the  issues  that  surfaced  from  the  empirical  investigation  (considering  the 
language  offered  by  the  prior  theoretical  framework  adopted)  and  to  embrace  the 
richness and diversity inherent in the empirical situation. 
 
The organisation’s profile 
The  subject  of  this  study  is  named  Green  Hospital[
3],  which  is  the  largest  non-
specialist (general) acute hospital in the South of England. The hospital’s size was 
significant  in  justifying  its  selection.  Green  Hospital  covered  a  population  of 
approximately 450,000 and employed 2,692 people (as at the end of March 2001). It 
presented particular problems, not perceived in the two other hospitals located in the 
same region. For example, it showed the worst financial situation and faced a budget 
deficit  of  £  4.747m  in  2002/03  (which  was  anticipated  in  the  Activity  and  Finance 
Report as at 31/03/01). Its main overspending directorate was the A&E department, 
which was the most directly affected by increased activity, recruitment and retention 
problems.  The  control  processes  introduced  by  the  Government  to  guide  English 
hospitals represent a macro steering mechanism.  
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THE MACRO CONTEXT 
Background 
There  has  been  considerable  literature  discussing  issues  related  to  performance 
measurement approaches. Most authors have taken a practical view (e.g. Boyne et al., 
2002; Smith, 1995b; Cavalluzzo and Ittner, 2004) while others have adopted a broader 
perspective (e.g. Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1986a; Covaleski, et al., 1996; Broadbent 
and  Laughlin,  1997).  A  rhetoric  that  emphasises  accounting  change  as  a  way  of 
promoting the notions of efficiency, effectiveness, and performance accountability in 
the  public  sector  is  reflected  in  the  literature  in  a  worldwide  perspective. 
Notwithstanding diverse approaches, researchers seem to be in agreement about the 
fact that public services have experienced increasing pressure to improve the quality 
of service delivery and, simultaneously, increasing pressure to diminish the financial 
demands  on  taxpayers  (Brignall  and  Modell,  2000).  Many  researchers  around  the 
world have called attention to a move from the traditional/bureaucratic administrative 
to a market-based approach to control public services and reforms that have placed 
considerable emphasis on customer focus, stakeholders’ interests, and other means of 
appraisal (e.g. Guthrie at al., 1999; Humphrey and Scapens, 1990; Kouzmin et al., 
1999). 
 
In the UK, for instance, the Government have introduced a set of objectives, targets 
and performance indicators throughout the public sector, from central government to 
local  level  organizations  (Chang,  2007;  Givan,  2005).  The  intention  is  to  improve 
accountability and influence behavior. In England, performance measurement policies 
were contained in the approach introduced by the Conservative Government (Smith, 
1993,  1995;  Baggott,  1998)  and  then  subtly  imposed  on  the  NHS  by  means  of  a  
13 
compulsory  set  of  measures  introduced  by  the  Labour  Government  in  1999  (1999 
Health  Act).  That  is  to  say,  whilst  preceding  initiatives  comparing  hospitals’ 
performance  intended  only  to  disclose  such  information  to  the  public  (e.g.  League 
Tables); a set of key targets was legally enforced during the period of 1999 to 2004 as 
a control device (NHS Performance Ratings – Acute Trusts, 2000/1). The emphasis on 
performance measurement introduced in 1999 was partially operationalised through 
the introduction of a series of bodies setting standards of healthcare to be delivered 
nationally (Department of Health, 2000, 2001b). This proposal intended to facilitate the 
modernization and reform policy of the English NHS for the following 10 years (The 
NHS Plan, July 2000). 
 
This paper adopts Laughlin (1991) and Broadbent and Laughlin’s (2005) analysis of 
organisational change to examine empirically how a particular English hospital reacted 
in  the  light  of  the  pressure  to  change  to meet  the  demand  of  the  first  star-ratings 
system introduced in England to assess general hospitals. This theoretical language 
offers the opportunity of building a broader perspective on how organizations attempt 
to adjust to meet macro desired behaviour. There is limited understanding of how such 
policies to control have affected micro contexts. The national performance framework 
introduced  by  the  English  Government  in  1999  put  forward  a  new  emphasis  on 
performance measurement to reflect aspects that they believed were of significance to 
public  sector  organizations.  It  is  within  this  framework  that  a  particular  set  of  key 
targets was introduced to assess the performance of hospitals in England.  
 
The  first  compulsory  steering  mechanism  introduced  a  star-ratings  scheme,  which 
covered only the acute hospitals – the so-called general hospitals (NHS Performance 
Ratings - Acute Trusts, 2000/01). This scheme evaluated hospitals against new broad-
based measures during the period of 12 months between 2000 and 2001. It was the  
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government’s statement that this initiative aimed to improve healthcare outcomes and 
provide  a  more  open  and  accountable  NHS  for  patients  and  the  public  with 
comprehensive, easily understandable information on the performance of their local 
health services (NHS Performance Ratings - Acute Trusts, 2000/01). A Commission of 
Health  Improvement  (CHI)  was  set  up  to  complement  the  rating  system  and  was 
considered a crucial feature in determining the evaluation of each hospital, as it was 
intended to oversee the quality of the clinical services delivered (Scally and Donaldson, 
1998). 
 
The rating scheme consisted of two sets of key targets which integrated non-financial 
and financial indicators. These indicators were intended to provide a balance across 
areas such as clinical, capacity and capability, and patient focus (table II). 
[table II here] 
 
The aspiration of the English Government to reduce the number of patients on elective 
(planned) waiting list/times became a central focus of the local healthcare programs 
(the  Waiting-List  Action  Team  Handbook,  August  1999,  DoH)  and  this  policy  was 
explicitly reflected in the performance ratings system introduce in the period between 
1999 to 2004 (see targets nos. 1,2,3,4,5, and 17,18,19,  Table II). 
 
The ten targets established in the first set were regarded as the most significant factors 
in  determining  the  hospitals’  overall  performance.  The  second  set  refined  the 
judgement between those hospitals which performed very well (performance rating of 
three stars) and well overall (performance rating of two stars). The performance therein 
its other scorecard areas (the clinical, patient and staff focus) was categorised into one 
of five bands, with five points awarded for the best performance and one for the worst.  
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Individual  band  scores  were  combined  to  produce  an  overall  score  per  area.  All 
indicators were equally weighted except the vacancy rates, where each vacancy rate 
had 2/3 weight, and the clinical focus indicators which had 4/3 weight. These weights 
were  chosen  to  balance  the  impact  of  each  of  the  three  areas  (NHS  Performance 
Ratings -Acute Trusts, 2000/01, 2000). The approach adopted allowed a broad range 
of areas to be measured within a single methodology. Therefore, the hospitals that 
presented high performance rating performed well against a rounded set of indicators. 
However, the approach used high level summary data and did not involve every area in 
depth. 
 
The government’s report presenting the result of the first star ratings system indicated 
that  such  a  scheme  aimed  to  provide  the  public  with  the  ability  to  compare  one 
hospital to another using a standard evaluation process as well as to serve as an 
important device for concentrating management attention on key strategic priorities 
and national targets. The performance against each key target was assessed in terms 
of  whether  each  target  was  achieved  or  whether  there  was  some  degree  of 
underachievement  or  whether  the  target  was  significantly  underachieved.  The  key 
targets  were  placed  within  one  of  these  three  categories  (DoH,  Regional  Office, 
Indicators, Methodology, 2000:1). Without providing further details, the report indicated 
that  hospitals’  performance  was  regarded  as  being  of  concern  if  there  was  (NHS 
Performance Ratings - Acute Trusts, 2000/01: 3):   
-  a sizeable number of targets with some degree of underachievement; or 
-  a  smaller  number  of  targets  against  which  there  has  been  significant  levels  of 
underachievement; or 
-  a combination of both. 
  
16 
Following the result of the performance ratings system[
4], the general hospitals were 
placed into one of four categories below (NHS Performance Ratings - Acute Trusts, 
2000/01: 3):   
Three  stars  –  were  awarded  to  hospitals  that  demonstrated  high  standards  of 
performance against both 1
st and 2
nd sets of targets. A three stars hospital was also 
reported as having good clinical governance by the CHI. 
Two stars – were awarded to hospitals that performed well overall, but did not achieve 
the highest standards.  
 
The hospitals that achieved high performance in the 1
st set of targets were classified 
as definite two or three stars on the basis of their performance in the clinical, patient 
and staff focus areas. The second set of measures was simply used to distinguish 
between  those  hospitals  that  were  awarded  a  three-stars  mark  in  the  core  target 
assessment.  The  hospitals  that  achieved  an  overall  score  equal  to  or  above  the 
average (median) in each and every of the clinical patient and staff focus areas were 
given a performance rating of three stars, the others received two. 
One  star  -  was  awarded  to  hospitals  where  there  was  some  cause  for  concern 
regarding  particular  key  performance  indicators,  which  means  that  they  performed 
worse than expected against some key targets. 
Zero stars –A zero stars hospital either failed against the key targets or was assessed 
as having very poor clinical governance by the CHI.  
 
To meet the set of key targets established at the macro level required alteration of the 
hospital’s design archetypes and sub-systems, which provoked a series of conflicts. 
There were significant incentives to pursue the targets as the so-called super hospitals 
(3-stars)  gained  financial  freedom  while  the  dirty  dozen  (zero-stars)  lost  their  
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autonomy. Thus, the number of stars awarded to hospitals determined the degree of 
intervention by the macro steering into the micro level. The question raised is how 
such an approach affected a particular empirical context.  
 
THE MICRO EFFECTS 
The operationalisation of the first performance ratings system within Green Hospital 
proved  complex.  Difficulties  in  managing  the  pressure  to  meet  its  demands 
accentuated  by  the  lack  of  resources  were  issues  raised  constantly  during  the 
hospital’s board meetings. However, the management team sought to implement a 
series of strategies with the intention of meeting some key targets simultaneously.  
 
Controllable disturbances: the intended pathway  
During the period between 1999 and 2001 Green Hospital embarked on a series of 
policies  with  the  aim  of  leading  the  organisation  to  achieve  some  key  PIs.  These 
initiatives impacted on the hospital’s daily activities in a conflicting way. A number fo 
these initiatives and their interaction are now considered in more detail.   
 
Controlling the number of admissions 
Controlling the number of patients on the waiting lists and the duration of their wait 
was an approach primarily adopted by the hospital’s management to try to balance the 
hospital’s existing resources and tackle the waiting-list achievement at the same time:  
“…I would rather not keep adding patients on waiting. Part of the reason is that 
they [the Government] restrain activities. They [the Government] make doctors 
feel uncomfortable about adding more people on the waiting list.” (Consultant 2) 
 
“At the end of the day, the waiting list is one way of rationing health care in the 
UK NHS, where there is no payment at the point of the delivery…” (Consultant 
4) [Emphasis added] 
 
“We  (Consultants)  have  the  power  to  decide  who  needs  an  operation 
immediately. However, the more the hospital does A&E, the longer the waiting  
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list will be…Sometimes, I just prefer not to include a patient on the waiting-list to 
avoid hearing him/her complain about the long waiting. But, it is frustrating not 
being able to meet patients’ expectations!” (Consultant 1) [Emphasis added] 
 
 
Prioritising young patients to the detriment of the elderly was another strategy adopted 
by the management team in seeking to balance the hospital’s resources. There was 
the  belief that elderly  patients have  multiple  health  problems,  which  implies  longer 
stays  and  the  constant  attention  of  staff.  This  perception  was  not  only  explicitly 
reflected in the discourses of clinical managers during board meetings (e.g. 30
th board 
meeting), but also stated in the interviews with medical personnel: 
 
“…Yesterday, I saw a 86-year old woman and she needed an operation[
5]. I 
thought that if I added her to the waiting list, a younger patient would wait longer 
for an operation. I spoke to the hospital’s clinical manager, and I said that she 
should  stay  in  the  hospital  until  they  [one  of  the  hospital’s  surgeon]  could 
operate on her. We would not have had this conversation if she were a 30-year 
old patient! We do this selection naturally! This is what the healthcare system 
imposes in this country.” (Consultant 3) [Emphasis Added]. 
 
 
The  notion  of  rationing  healthcare  in  the  name  of  balancing  resources  was,  thus, 
reflected in a tangible way in the hospital’s design archetypes, which were informed by 
the values of the management team. That is, there was an indication that rationing has 
been  part  of  individual’s  interpretative  schemes  for  some  time,  regardless  of  the 
pressure  experienced  by  the  organisation  to  change  to  meet  the  demands  of  a 
particular control device (see also Harrison and Dowswell, 2001).  
 
Concentration on day-case surgery 
Controlling the number of waiting-list admission by selecting patients according to the 
nature of the operation was another example of attempts to balance the hospital’s 
resources and tackle the achievement of some key targets simultaneously. Day-case 
procedures  were  frequently  preferred  to  more  complex  cases  (30th  Board  Meeting  
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Reports, January/2001). Day-case patients (e.g. cataract operations) were frequently 
favored,  as  part  of  the  management  team’s  expectation  of  tackle  the  demands  of 
several key targets at once, for instance, the achievement of target 1 (shorter inpatient 
waiting lists). The discourses of medical personnel implied that this was a common 
practice within the Hospital.   
“… A senior nurse has been appointed for pre-assessment, in order to attempt 
to convert in-patient surgery to day-case surgery, wherever this is possible. The 
Trust has already focused on day cases to enable it to reduce the length of 
waiting lists more rapidly and cheaply.” (Senior Nurse 2) 
 
 “In doing day-case, I can actually achieve a certain sense of self-satisfaction 
which, in the current circumstances (pressure to meet targets); I would not be 
able to… Therefore, I can help more patients by doing 50% or 60% or possibly 
more  of  all  my  surgeries  as  day-case.  However,  I  still  have  the  remaining 
patients who require hospital beds and, therefore, I still have to compete with 
other surgeons for beds.”  (Surgeon 1) 
 
Day-case procedures were also adopted to alleviate the pressure on trolley waiting in 
the A&E; as day-case patients can be accommodated on trolleys this leaves more beds 
for patients transferred to wards from A&E. Green Hospital managed to report fewer 
patients  waiting  in  A&E  on  trolleys  for  more  than  12  hours  (target  4).  It  was  the 
management expectation that the focus on day cases would result in additional beds 
being available in the wards. Therefore, the hospital’s capability to reduce cancellations 
of operation of elective (planned) patient should have increased (24
th Board Meeting). 
 
The focus on day cases was also intended to improve the hospital’s ability to report a 
satisfactory financial position (target 9) and the use of day cases was regarded as a 
rapid  and  economical  method  to  tackle  the  waiting-list  targets  (28th  Board  Meeting 
Report,  2001),  because  it  does  not  (usually)  entail  inpatient  costs  (e.g.  costs 
associated with accommodation, meals and attention from staff, especially carers and 
nurses).  
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During the course of the investigation, the day case rate of Green Hospital was 74%, 
which was considered excessive compared with the national standard peer group rate 
of 65% (Financial and Activity Report, March, 2001). Concerns with the high level of 
day-case procedure undertaken within Green hospital were raised in the board meeting 
(e.g. 29th Board Meeting, 2000). 
 
Closing wards 
Closing wards was another strategy initially adopted by Green Hospital in seeking to 
cope with the demand of some key targets. It was intended to reduce the general 
increase in expenses and, in particular, the high cost associated with bank and agency 
staff  [
6] as well as to alleviate the pressure on nurses and carers. Two wards were 
closed during the period between October 2000 and January 2001. This act resulted in 
a permanent loss of nine beds (31
st and 32
nd Board Meeting Reports).  
   
    “I hope we can reopen these wards in the future. The closure of these wards 
improved morale of staff, since it diminished the pressure on them (especially 
nurses and carers) as well as it allowed the recruitment on other surgical wards 
that admit patients from A&E. However, closing wards in a busy hospital like this, 
it  is  a  warning  for  politicians,  given  the  continuous  rise  in  demand.”  (Chief 
Executive) 
 
Regardless  of  the  statement  above,  a  closure  of  an  additional  medical  ward  was 
announced  in  the  following  board  meeting,  in  seeking  to  accomplish  a  saving  of 
£350,000,  as  part  of  the  Performance  Improvement  Plan  for  2001-02  set  for  that 
region (27
th Board Meeting Report).  
 
Non-controllable disturbances: the actual pathway 
Despite the management effort to implement initiatives to accomplish the demands of 
some key targets, ensuing internal and external sets of unwanted and unexpected  
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environmental  forces  emerged  which  led  to  non-intended  (actual)  outcomes.  For 
example, the focus on day cases contributed to the achievement of some targets, such 
as targets 1 and 4. However, the excessive concentration engendered an adverse set 
of unmanageable disturbances that, added to external environmental pressure (e.g. 
A&E increased demand, lack of qualified staff), contributed to the Hospital’s negative 
result in the ratings system (table III).  
 
[table III here] 
 
The effects of day case use 
The excessive concentration on day-case practice resulted in a series of conflicting 
changes  in  clinical  work.  For  instance,  patients  diagnosed  with  severe  conditions, 
which required longer stay in hospital (e.g. hip replacement, hernia), were left waiting 
longer  (32
nd  Board  Meeting  Report).  Some  of  them  eventually  became  emergency 
patients: 
 
  “One  way  of  dealing  with  the  waiting-list  targets  is  by  reducing  demand. 
Therefore, very often we choose not to increase the length of waiting list! In 
some cases, we wait until the patient health condition becomes worse to include 
him/her in emergency case. (Consultant 1) [Emphasis added). 
 
However, such an approach aggravated the existing A&E intense workload, as was 
claimed  by  managers  during  board  meetings  (e.g.  33
rd  Board  Meeting  Report). 
Similarly, constant pressure to release beds in wards to accommodate A&E patients 
led to a succession of other uncontrollable and unwanted disturbances, such as early 
discharge, low quality of care, bed blocking, delayed discharge and cancellation of  
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operation on the day.  These issues were not only raised in several board meetings 
and  interviews,  but  also  mentioned  in  the  hospital’s  internal  reports  (i.e.  Activity 
Management and Emergency Report, July 2001). 
 
Early discharge  
Although the initiative of focusing on day cases was intended to alleviate the hospital’s 
financial  position,  it  adversely  affected  the  hospital’s  general  ability  to  present  a 
satisfactory  financial  situation  (target  9),  because  it  led  to  pressure  to  discharge 
patients prematurely. Readmission is costly:  
 
“We are in such pressure to get people back home very quickly due to cost 
pressure;  getting  patients  coming  in  and  out  very  promptly!  …sometime 
something can go wrong! When we do blood test for instance! (A&E clinician in 
a board meeting) 
 
On some occasions, early discharge led to readmission, which implied additional cost 
(Activity Management and Emergency Report, June/2001). The pressure to discharge 
patients rapidly generated further conflict, such as leading to a low quality of care (32
nd 
Board Meeting Report). 
 
Low quality of care 
The  pressure  to  discharge  patients  within  Green  Hospital  eventually  proved 
detrimental to patients’ general recovery, particularly in the case of the elderly, who 
are more vulnerable to infection (Quality Report, Feb/2001): 
 
Yesterday, for example, there was a patient next door, who was unfit to leave 
the  hospital,  because  we  thought  she  might  be  infected.  However,  she  was 
discharged in the afternoon. In fact, she should have stayed overnight!” (Nurse 
4) [Emphasis added) 
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The  excessive  concentration  on  day  cases  impacted  on  the  hospital’s  ability  of 
presenting a satisfactory emergency readmission rates within 28 days of discharge 
(target 12) and to show a satisfactory number of deaths within 30 days of surgery 
(target  13).  Green  Hospital  significant  underachieved  two  (out  of  three)  targets 
regarding clinical focus (table III).  
 
Bed blocking, delayed discharge and cancellation 
Although the management strategy of closing wards was initially believed to indicate a 
potential benefit for the hospital in terms of financial pressure, its effects influenced the 
achievement of other key targets. For instance, it led to the permanent loss of beds, 
which itself contributed to both bed blocking[
7] and delay-discharge issues (34
th Board 
Meeting Report).   
 
During the investigation, both bed occupancy and delayed discharge rates presented 
in the reports were highlighted as sources of concern (TeamWork[
8] Group Report, 
Dec  2000).  Bed  occupancy  averaged  95%,  which  was  considered  high  (Activity 
Management  and  Emergency  Report,  July/2001).  The  issue  of  bed  blocking 
aggravated the delay-discharge crisis within Green Hospital, and vice versa. This was 
an effect of the hospital’s inability to offer convalescence care, which in England is 
provided by tertiary care[
9] (Teamwork Management Services Report for December 
2000).   
 
The bed-blocking problem experienced by Green Hospital was worsened by the lack 
of nursing homes in its vicinity (Board meeting report, January 2001). On one day 21 
elderly patients were retained in the wards, although they were ready to depart. This 
number was considered high and a reason for concern (HA Activity Report, Dec/2000).  
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Bed blocking also affected the quality of care delivered by Green Hospital, since a long 
stay in hospital was seeing as damaging to the general clinical condition of the elderly 
(Quality Report, Feb/2001).  
 
Both bed blocking and delayed discharge added to the hospital’s general shortage of 
beds and increasing demand in A&E led to an increase in the number of cancelled 
operations on the day (28
th Board Meeting Report).  The hospital failed to achieve less 
than 1% of operations cancelled on the day (target 6). Cancellation of operations for 
elective (planned) patients usually occurred due to the shortage of beds, which were 
competed for both elective and non-elective (A&E) patients: 
 
“It is quite normal for us (the Hospital) to not know at this time of the morning 
(by 9.30 am), whether an elective patient would be admitted to be operated in 
the afternoon. At the moment, for example, we have 3 (three) patients waiting in 
the  A&E  trolleys  and  another  3  (three)  planned  patients  to  get  in  routinely. 
However, we have only 1 (one) bed and a possible other bed next door (day-
case discharge). So, there are 2 (two) beds for 6 (six) patients today…” (Sister 
Nurse 2) 
 
A&E increased demand  
Increasing demand in the A&E[
10], added to both delayed discharge and bed blocking 
issues,  exacerbated  the  hospital’s  ability  to  cope  with  the  waiting-list  achievement. 
3.6%  of  the  increased  demand  in  A&E  during  2000  related  to  over-contracted 
emergency  activity  (Teamwork  Management  Services  Final  Report  for  December 
2000). NHS Hospitals do not have control over A&E’s demands, since the Emergency 
Capacity Service (ECS) is responsibility of local health authorities (Health Authority 
Activity Report, July/2001). Within Green Hospital, the demand in A&E increased 10% 
during the period of 2000 and 2001 compared with the same period in 1999/2000 
(Activity and Finance Report, Dec/2000). As non-elective patients have priority over 
the elective, increasing demand in A&E caused a reduction in the number of available  
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beds in the wards, which impacted on the waiting-list achievement. Green Hospital’s 
workload intensity and the consequent pressure on staff (particularly on nurses and 
carers)  led  to  recruitment  and  retention  problems  (Workforce  Information  Report, 
March 2000).  
 
Recruitment and retention problems 
Several non-controllable (internal and external) environmental disturbances emerged 
as influencing the recruitment and retention of nurses by Green Hospital (Workforce 
Information Report for April/2001). Factors such as active private medicine within the 
region  (which  offers  better  remuneration  than  the  NHS);  high  housing-cost;  poor 
transportation links and a lack of social activities were pointed to as issues by the HR 
manager during board meetings (Workforce Information Report for June/2001). During 
the period between 1999 and 2001, the average number of nurses and carers leaving 
Green Hospital was 39 (thirty-nine) per month, which was considered high, compared 
with the level at the two other hospitals located within the same region (HA Activity 
Report,  July  2002).  Green  Hospital  was  the  first  NHS  Hospital  in  England  to  hire 
nurses from the Philippines (Workforce Information Report for June/2001).  
 
Controllable and uncontrollable consequences 
As initially intended by the management team, Green Hospital was able to accomplish 
some  waiting-list/time  targets.  For  example,  it  was  able  to  present  achievement  of 
plans to reduce the total inpatient-waiting list (target 1); no patients waiting more than 
18 months for inpatient appointment (target 2) and no patients with suspected breast 
cancer waiting more than two weeks to be seen in hospital (target 5). It also achieved 
target 18, because it was able to control the number of outpatients seen within 13  
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weeks  of  General  Practitioner  (GP)  referral  for  first  outpatient’s  appointment,  as  a 
percentage of all outpatients seen following GPs’ written referral for first appointment.  
 
Albeit in different ways, controllable and non-controllable events and resulting effects 
that surfaced during the hospital’s attempts to change to meet the demands of the key 
targets  interrelated  in  a  contradictory  and  complex  fashion,  which  influenced  the 
hospital’s  general  capacity  to  accomplish  relevant  key  targets  (table  III).  Green 
Hospital failed to achieve 9 (nine) out of the 20 (twenty) key targets. It was unable to 
meet 3(three) out of 8(eight) waiting-list/time targets [
11]. It significantly underachieved 
target 3, because it did not manage to present achievement of plans to reduce the 
number of outpatients waiting over 13 weeks. Following an increase in the demand of 
A&E  incoming  patients,  Green  Hospital  was  unable  to  achieve  less  than  1%  of 
operation cancelled on the day (target 6). 
 
The shortage of beds in wards led to longer waiting time in A&E on trolleys (Board 
Meeting  Reports,  Jan/2001),  which  affected  the  hospital’s  ability  to  report  a 
satisfactory percentage of patients waiting on trolleys for more than four hours before 
being admitted in the hospital’s wards (underachievement of target 19). However, the 
hospital  had  fewer  patients  waiting  on  trolleys  for  more  than  12  hours  (target  4). 
Contradicting initial expectations, longer trolley waits aggravated the hospital’s existing 
financial problem due to an increase in A&E general costs and, in particular, in the 
costs associated with bank and agency staff (Activity and Finance Report July/2001). 
As  shown  in  table  III,  Green  Hospital  reported  significant  underachievement  of  a 
planned Income and Expenditure position (target 9). 
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Adjustments made in an attempt to accomplish the demands of the first performance 
ratings scheme proved contradictory, despite the management team’s effort towards 
its achievement. The dysfunctional nature of the waiting-list/time targets was a theme 
that surfaced in every board meeting and interview attended during the course of this 
investigation, which preceded the publication of the result of the performance ratings 
scheme by the Government in September 2001.    
 
Discussions  raised  during  the  hospital’s  board  meetings  concerning  delayed 
discharges and the lack of staff were raised and emphasized on the CHI report, which 
corroborated the findings of this study. The executive team recognised the significant 
pressures  facing  this  particular  Hospital.  They  acknowledged  that  this  organisation 
was facing issues, with the responsibility for addressing them lying with the regional 
office (CHI Quality Report, Regional Office, 29
th Nov 2001). Nonetheless, whilst the 
other two NHS hospitals located within the same region were awarded three and two 
stars, Green Hospital was awarded zero stars and become one of the dirty dozen, 
which led to the replacement of its management team.    
 
DISCUSSION 
Linkages between macro –micro steering  
This study builds an understanding of the structures of the relationships that emerged 
during  attempts  to  change  to  meet  the  macro-steering  demands.  It  discusses  the 
interaction  between  the  macro  and  micro  levels,  based  on  prior  theories  of  those 
relationships. Laughlin’s (1991) model and Broadbent and Laughlin’s (2005) analysis 
provided a language to allow reflection on the control processes concerning the macro 
steering and the micro effects within the context of performance measurement in the 
UK public services.   
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The  analysis  of  this  case  suggests  that  the  macro  steering  (expressed  through  a 
particular set of key targets), acted to enforce and regulate desired behaviour. The 
analysis of the empirical situation suggests that this organisation was compelled into 
diverse coping mechanisms during its attempts to change to meet the demands of the 
key targets. It was embraced by a set of internal and external environmental forces, 
which themselves were composed by diverse elements linked in a complex manner, 
as  they  compelled  and  were  compelled  by  each  other,  emulating  the  notion  of  a 
domino effect.  
 
The pathways of change 
The  analysis  of  this  case  suggests  that  an  initial  linear  pathway  of  change  was 
originally  intended  by  this  organisation.  This  pathway  was  built  by  the  generated 
proactive  strategies  intentionally  implemented  by  the  management  team  at  first,  in 
seeking  to  achieve  certain  outcomes  (some  key  targets).  However,  the  intended 
pathway was distorted along the way by expected effects (e.g. the permanent loss of 
beds) resulting from expected internal disturbances (e.g. closure of wards). This initial 
pathway  was  also  affected  by  the  pressure  exerted  by  a  set  of  non-controllable 
environmental  forces  (e.g.  the  increased  demand  of  patients  in  A&E)  and  ensuing 
effects  (e.g.  pressure  on  staff  and  consequent  issues  regarding  recruitment  and 
retention) externally imposed into the micro level settings. In the end, the intended 
linear  pathway  was  transformed  into  a  twisty  (actual)  pathway,  which  led  to  non-
intended outcomes (the non-achievement of some crucial key targets).  
 
Whilst different strategies were pursued in seeking to attain the demands of particular 
targets,  their  interaction  led  to  the  non-achievement  of  others.  This  combination  
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affected the hospital’s clinical work in perverse ways. For instance, evidence indicates 
that dysfunctions such as rationing, exclusion, and disregard to clinical priority became 
common practice within Green Hospital. This case reflects in practice the theoretical 
situation  described  by  Broadbent  and  Laughlin  (2005),  who  anticipated  that  the 
steering media can get out of control and move societal systems into new levels of 
activity and concern (e.g. exclusion and rationing), regardless of the intentions of those 
responsible for the macro steering mechanism.  
 
However, unlike Broadbent and Laughlin (2005), Broadbent (1992), Laughlin (1991) 
and Bartunek (1984) foresee, this case suggests that resulting dysfunctions emerged 
from external environmental pressures, rather than from cultural differences perceived 
within  this  organisation  (interpretative  schemes).  Internal  report  produced  by 
TeamWork  confirmed  that  there  were  two  main  external  environmental  forces 
impacting on the hospital’s difficulties in coping with the pressure exerted by the macro 
steering. The first aspect concerned the hospital’s inability to control the increasing 
demand in A&E, given that local health authorities are responsible for the provision of 
emergency  services.  The  second  aspect  concerned  a  series  of  problems  resulting 
from  such  features  as  bed  blocking,  private  medicine,  workload  intensity  and  the 
consequent  issue  of  recruitment  and  retention.  These  two  problems  can  only  be 
remedied through the expansion of intermediate care within the region (e.g. increasing 
the number of nursing home) and this was an issue raised during a particular board 
meeting by TeamWork. At a later stage, it was also acknowledged by the CHI (Quality 
Report - Regional Office, 29th Nov 2001).  
 
Organisation’s interpretative schemes and design archetypes  
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The analysis concerning the nature of the organisational design archetypes provided 
the basis for discovering the impact of the institutional steering mechanisms on the 
organisation.  
 
Laughlin’s (1991) and Broadbent and Laughlin’s (2005:16, 17) analysis suggest that 
the process of  change  can  be  understood in  two  separate  ways  -  ‘colonisation’  or 
‘reorientation’ pathways.  The analysis of this situation suggests that the application of 
the  model  proved  more  complex  than  the  model  might  suggest.  This  single  case 
illustrates  both  situations  simultaneously.  For  exempla,  Green  Hospital’s  history  of 
prioritising  young  patients  to  the  detriment  of  the  elderly  in  an  attempt  to  balance 
resources seems to reflect a case of ‘colonisation’. Their discourse indicates that they 
have  exercised  this  choice  for  some  time,  and  this  represents  an  effect  of  a 
disturbance externally imposed onto the structure of the hospital’s design archetypes. 
This fact indicates that the notion of rationing has become part of the lifeworld that 
informs the macro-steering mechanisms, which has permeated the micro level and 
has become part of the individual interpretative schemes and design archetypes.  
 
Clinicians’ discourses indicated that, although they feel frustrated when they are not 
able  to  meet  patients’  expectations,  they  are  able  to  switch  to  the  rationing  mode 
naturally  (for  whatever  reason).  Therefore,  rationing  has  become  part  of  this 
organisation’s  interpretative  schemes.    Whilst  consultants’  statements  about 
prioritising young patient at the expenses of the elderly might have been considered 
very inappropriate sometime ago, it is currently part of their conversation and practice. 
This  fact  suggests  that  the  ‘colonisation’  pathway  is  present,  because  such 
disturbance  has  affected  the  organisation’s  interpretative  schemes.  Therefore, 
regarding the level of change, a state of second-order change might be applicable to  
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this case. The replacement of the management team, followed by the hospital’s poor 
result in the performance ratings system, suggests that the macro steering intention 
and attempts of colonisation have increased. 
 
On the other hand, a case of ‘reorientation’ pathways is also present here, because 
the  implementation  of  the  ratings  system  is  perceived  by  different  organisational 
members (both managers and medical personnel) as a medium of money and power; 
rather  than  a  reflection  of  the  societal  lifeworld.  This  perception  is  shared  by  the 
organisational members. It is, for instance, manifested in the clinicians’ discourse (e.g. 
‘this  is  what  the  health  system  in  this  country  imposes!  p.  18).  Such  a  statement 
suggests that there was no intention of challenging the performance ratings policy, but 
to  accommodate  it.  Therefore,  the  hospital’s  management  team  (which  includes 
consultants) made the choice of attempting to ‘absorb’ the disturbances (Broadbent 
and Laughlin, 2005, p. 17).  The focus on day-case procedures (albeit not the only 
one)  is  an  example  of  the  hospital’s  attempt  to  find  a  system  (structure)  to 
accommodate the disturbances to evade changes to the interpretative scheme, rather 
than challenging them. Nonetheless, attempts to ‘absorb’ in this case did not function 
and, instead, led to further disturbances and the consequent under-achievement of 
other  key  targets  (non-intended  outcome).  However,  it  is  difficult  to  affirm  that  the 
imposition  of  external  key  performance  indicators,  on  its  own,  led  to  second-order 
change in this case.  
 
The  analysis  of  this  case  indicated  that even  when  organisations  pursue  proactive 
strategies, they can be deflected from their intended purpose and, therefore, fail to 
achieve the intended outcomes. It also suggests that, even reactive strategies can fail  
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to provide the deflection needed (e.g. accommodate the destructive disturbances) and, 
instead, they can lead to worse outcomes, rather than those intended.  
 
CONCLUSION 
This paper adds to the wider debate on performance management in healthcare and 
builds some understanding of how organisations respond to the pressure to change to 
meet the government’s expectations. It discusses the interface between organisational 
and  accounting  change  and  indicates  that  the  operationalisation  of  the  first 
performance ratings introduced in England to force changes at hospitals’ level proved 
challenging and led to radical changes. This represented a new experience for the 
English healthcare system.  
 
The analysis of the legislation and policies directing the delivery of healthcare services 
in England suggests that reforms have introduced new steering mechanisms, without 
allowing  sufficient  time  for  preceding  reforms  to  settle  before  new  reforms  are 
introduced. New alternative arrangements for checking on the performance of English 
hospitals
 and doctors were introduced in 2004 (DoH, 2004). Although they have not 
been  fully  implemented  yet,  they  predicted  the  end  to  the  unpopular  star  ratings 
system (White, 2004).
 A payment-by-result system has been introduced. The nature of 
the new scheme reflects the macro-steering desire of moving towards a more directly 
resource  allocation  policy.  As  changes  of  this  nature  have  progressively  and 
persistently been introduced at hospital level, it may well be that they will gradually 
impinge onto the interpretative schemes. Nonetheless, as interpretative schemes are 
of dynamic and amendable nature, it is crucial that further research is undertaken, in 
order to provide additional understanding of the development of control processes in 
healthcare and the future role that they expect to play in society.  
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Notes: 
                                                 
[
1]The 21 months investigation ended in July 2001. The study, therefore, examines a unique and defined period, 
which includes the organisation’s attempts at that time to cope with macro and micro disturbances.   
[
2]The hospital board meetings took place every eight weeks during the period of 1999-2001. They aimed to 
inform the local community and Health Authority about the general aspects of the hospital’s management. The 
meetings  evolved  around  discussions  previously  set  in  a  large  report  containing  information  related  to  the 
hospital’s financial, activity, quality and personnel matters. Those reports were posted to the researcher a couple of 
days prior to the meetings. These meetings were organised into two main parts. Only the first part, which last ed 
approximately three hours, was open to the public and, thus, to the researcher.  
[
3] As anonymity was assured, the hospital under consideration is named Green Hospital, due to the green area that 
surrounds it. 
[
4] The government’s report presenting the first rating result was published in the main English newspapers in 
September 2001 (e.g. The Guardian, Thursday, 26
th September 2001). It informed that thirty-five NHS general 
hospitals were awarded three stars while twelve were awarded zero stars. The English press quickly named the 
former group ‘the super hospitals’ and the latter ‘the dirty dozen’. 
[
5] Disease omitted to protect the identity of the consultant, as requested by him. 
[
6]Bank staff is formed by the hospital’s staff when they are not working in their normal shifts. Agency staff are 
hired from agency (e.g. BNA-British Nurses Association), which is the most expensive way of covering the lack 
of nurses. It costs 50% more than the nurses employed by the hospital. 
[
7] Bed-blocking is a term used to name beds that are occupied by patients who, although are clinically fit to be 
discharged, remain in hospital for whatever reason. 
[
8]Teamwork Management Services Report was prepared by Teamwork Group, which was a consultancy company 
hired by the local Health Authority, with the Hospital’s collaboration, to review service pressures faced by this 
Hospital. They presented their conclusion in the Hospital’s board meeting held on the 11
th Oct 2000.  
[
9] There are three levels of care in the UK NHS: primary care through family doctors, opticians and others; 
secondary  care  through  hospitals  and  ambulances  services;  and  tertiary  care  through  specialists  hospitals  for 
particular types of illness. 
[
10]  Further  research  indicated  that  Performance  Managers  working  for  the  local  Health  Authority  expressed 
concerns with the increased demand of Green Hospital’s A&E. According to them, this was difficult to explain, 
since  increasing  demand  in  A&E  is  usually  associated  with  deprivation,  which  is  totally  non-existent  in  this 
particular region of the country. 
[
11] Targets 8 (cleanliness) and 20 (complaints) were not examined and/or commented upon here, because they 
were not mentioned, at any stage, during this empirical investigation. 
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